RUSSIA'S MULTIPLE OPERATIONS in Ukraine / Lt Col Daniel Davis & Larry Johnson

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive November 13, 2025
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Daniel Davis / Deep Dive

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** NEW MERCH ** Jackets & Sweatshirts, Thermo Mugs!! Daniel Davis Deep Dive Merch: Etsy store https://www.etsy.com/shop/DanielDavisDeepDive?ref=seller-platform-mcnav Russia has expanded its troop strength gradually without declaring a full national mobilization, relying instead on conscripts, contract soldiers, and steady recruitment. With training cycles of 3–6 months, Russia reached sufficient manpower in 2025 to launch nine simultaneous offensive operations along the roughly 1,300-km front—far more than in 2023–24. NATO, by contrast, has failed to increase weapons production at scale across key categories such as drones, artillery shells, air defense, tanks, and barrels. No NATO economy in Europe is growing above ~1.5%, and several are in recession, complicating military production goals. Rising energy costs and sanctions have hurt European industry, causing economic fragmentation within NATO. Russia is now outperforming Ukraine and the West technologically in drones, hypersonics, missile production, glide bombs, AI-driven and EW-resistant drones, and integrated drone warfare. Russia has even created a dedicated military drone branch, including units specialized in locating and killing Ukrainian drone operators. Ukraine, meanwhile, suffers heavy monthly casualties—estimated at around 40,000 per month in this account—and lacks manpower reserves or time for adequate training. New recruits are rushed directly to the front. Desertions worsen the manpower deficit. Ukraine cannot match losses with sufficient recruitment or training. Russia retains large un-mobilized manpower reserves and continues to attract volunteers with financial incentives. Its industry responds quickly to frontline needs, without Western-style procurement bottlenecks. Given these trends—Russian momentum, Ukrainian manpower collapse, and Western industrial stagnation—the speakers suggest Ukraine may reach a breaking point by late winter or early spring, becoming unable to sustain the war. They argue that the cumulative weight of casualties, equipment shortages, and economic limitations will likely determine the outcome.

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