史无前例：两个月不敢出北京｜习近平最近比较烦｜Unprecedented: Not daring to leave Beijing for two months |

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史无前例：两个月不敢出北京｜习近平最近比较烦｜Unprecedented: Not daring to leave Beijing for two months | Xi Jinping has been rather troubled lately | 朋友们大家好，欢迎大家回到老杜的内部视角看中国。 近日来，有关中国的新闻变得愈发沉闷。最近比较烦、比较烦、比较烦，习近平最近比较烦，而且不是一般的烦，不是哪一件事卡住了，不是哪一次会议没开好，而是三条线同时出问题。第一条线，是军队这条线不稳，张又侠刘振利案清洗整肃未完成，各地的将军们磨刀霍霍，没有人敢保证习近平离开北京的安全，万般无奈，史无前例，他已经连续两个月不敢离开北京，未来持续多久不好说。这种情况在整个中共历史上都极为罕见们也许被老杜这么一刺激他会提前出京；第二条线，是外交这条线被打断，原计划三月底川普应约来访，这本来是中共近9年来最重头的外交大事，北京方面全力准备，结果因为伊朗战争爆发，川普要求习近平派兵到霍尔木兹海峡护航，习近平拒绝，川普借故推迟访问北京，习近平本来已经准备好了，做好了全力以赴接待川普的准备，结果这么一弄，他一下子突然没事干了，未免万分失落；第三条线，是国内舆论这条线压不住。留意中国国内近期的热点新闻就会发现，热点新闻全是负面新闻，例如吉林长春路虎车主八次别停奔驰车最终导致事故，公安迫于舆论压力立案、派出所教导员利用职权猥亵15岁女孩儿被判刑两年九个月等，这与习近平近年来越来越严厉的互联网管控背道而驰，与习近平一再要求的讲好中国故事，做好舆论引导背道而驰，警察政治难以破局滔滔民意，民意难为，管制失控，习近平比较烦。看起来是三件事，实际上是同一个结论：这个体制正在失去“把风险分散出去”的能力，最后所有压力，都重新压回到最高权力本身。 Hello friends, welcome back to Lao Du’s Internal Perspective on China. In recent days, news related to China has grown increasingly heavy. Lately there has been much trouble, much trouble, much trouble—Xi Jinping has been quite troubled recently, and not in an ordinary way. It is not that a single matter is stuck, nor that one meeting went poorly, but that three lines are encountering problems simultaneously. The first line is the military line, which is unstable. The purges and rectifications surrounding the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli have not been completed. Generals across various regions are sharpening their knives; no one can guarantee Xi Jinping’s safety if he leaves Beijing. Left with no alternative, in an unprecedented situation, he has already not dared to leave Beijing for two consecutive months. How long this will continue is uncertain. Such a situation is extremely rare in the entire history of the Chinese Communist Party—perhaps, stimulated by Lao Du’s remarks, he might leave Beijing earlier. The second line is the diplomatic line, which has been interrupted. Originally, Trump was scheduled to visit at the end of March. This was to have been the most significant diplomatic event for the CCP in nearly nine years, and Beijing had made full preparations. However, due to the outbreak of war in Iran, Trump requested that Xi Jinping dispatch troops to escort shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Xi refused, and Trump used this as a pretext to postpone his visit to Beijing. Xi Jinping had already prepared himself, ready to receive Trump with full effort, but with this sudden change, he found himself with nothing to do, and could not help but feel deeply disappointed. The third line is domestic public opinion, which cannot be suppressed. Observing recent trending news within China reveals that the headlines are entirely negative—for example, the Changchun Jilin incident in which a Land Rover driver repeatedly blocked a Mercedes eight times, ultimately causing an accident, leading police to file a case under public pressure; and a police station instructor abusing his authority to molest a 15-year-old girl, receiving a sentence of two years and nine months. These developments run counter to Xi Jinping’s increasingly strict internet controls in recent years, and against his repeated calls to “tell China’s story well” and guide public opinion. Political policing struggles to break through the surging tide of public sentiment; public opinion is difficult to manage, control is slipping, and Xi Jinping is troubled. It appears to be three separate issues, but in reality it leads to a single conclusion: this system is losing its ability to “disperse risk,” and in the end, all pressure is being forced back onto the highest authority itself.